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Merck v. Integra:
Bailing Water Without Plugging the Hole
I. INTRODUCTION
When Rochelle Dreyfuss, Pauline Newman Professor of Law at New
York University School of Law, began working as a bench chemist for a
pharmaceutical company in the late 1970s, there was a vigorous, free
exchange of ideas, experimental results, and even novel chemical
compounds between academia and industry.1 This exchange was based
on the Mertonian ethos, and free access to scientific advances through
the public domain was the norm.2 In essence, islands of private patent
rights floated in a sea of pro-competitive public domain and, by default,
scientific discoveries were part of that public domain.3
A very different world confronts researchers today. Universities seek
and profit greatly from patents, which would have been unthinkable
thirty years ago.4 Pharmaceutical companies are now reluctant to share
discoveries and information with universities because these are viewed
as direct competitors. The vigorous public sphere of science has
substantially eroded. The paradigm has radically shifted such that islands
of public domain float about in a vast sea of anti-competitive patent
rights.5 Intellectual property is now the default.
As part of what will be shown to be a limited move back towards the
previously prevailing competitive baseline, Merck v. Integra6 served to
affirm an expansive reading of the § 271(e)(1) safe-harbor created in the
1984 Hatch-Waxman Act.7 In its unanimous decision penned by Justice
1.Rochelle Dreyfuss, Biotechnology Patents Get Special Treatment: Protecting the
Public Domain of Science: Has the Time for an Experimental Defense Arrived?, 46 ARIZ. L. REV.
457, 458 (Fall 2004) (explored in detail in PART V, infra).
2. Id. at 464.
3. Id. at 465. This paradigm squares well with the strong presumption against the validity of
monopolies that tempered the creation of the patent system in the United States.
4. Id. at 464; see also Bayhing for Blood or Doling Out Cash?, Economist.com, available at
http://www.economist.com/science/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_id=5327661 (discussing the pros,
cons, and the recent “backlash” against the patenting of technologies by universities).
5. Rochelle Dreyfuss, Biotechnology Patents Get Special Treatment: Protecting the Public
Domain of Science: Has the Time for an Experimental Defense Arrived?, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 457, 465
(Fall 2004).
6. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005).
7. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 STAT. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301,
355, 360cc (2003); 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1993); 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282 (2003)).
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Scalia, the Supreme Court affirmed an expansive definition of §
271(e)(1) and continued the trend in patent law of extending protection
from infringement liability in the drug sector as far as prudent. The Court
missed, however, the opportunity to breathe life into the embattled and,
arguably, defunct common-law research exemption.
Part II of this Comment will briefly trace the histories of the
common-law research exemption and the Hatch-Waxman safe-harbor.
Part III will outline Integra v. Merck, the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit (CAFC or Federal Circuit) decision that led to Merck.
Part IV will analyze Merck in detail, emphasizing that decision’s
beneficial reversal of the CAFC’s restrictive opinion in Integra. Part V
will then address Merck’s missed opportunity to deal with the commonlaw research exemption and the treatment of research tools under §
271(e)(1), which have the potential to seriously impact the public domain
in biomedical and pharmaceutical research. Part V advances possible
solutions and addresses the shortcomings of each. Part VI concludes by
urging Congress to action.
II. RESEARCH EXEMPTION AND § 271(E)(1) SAFE-HARBOR
A. Common-law Research Exemption
Just as reproduction of an expression protected by copyright
constitutes copyright infringement, use of a patented invention
constitutes patent infringement.8 Unlike copyright law, however, no
statutory fair-use exemption exists in patent law.9 Only an embattled
common-law exemption is available to most accused patent infringers.
In 1813, Whittemore v. Cutter introduced the first common-law
exemption to patent infringement.10 In Whittemore, Justice Story stated
“[i]t could never have been the intention of the legislature to punish a
man, who [without license] constructed such a [patent protected]
machine merely for philosophical experiments . . . .”11 Several
subsequent cases mentioned this “research” exemption in dicta but
generally found it inapplicable to the particular facts.12
The exemption narrowed continually in dicta until 2002 when the
CAFC, in Madey v. Duke, essentially interred it. In Madey, the Federal

8. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2005); 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2005).
9. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2005).
10. Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.D. Mass. 1813).
11. Id.
12. Ruth E. Freeburg, Comment, No Safe Harbor and No Experimental Use: Is it Time for
Compulsory Licensing of Biotech Tools?, 53 BUFFALO L. REV. 351, 363-64, n.75 (Winter 2005).
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Circuit was confronted with Duke University’s use of a patented laser in
its research laboratories.13 Because use of the laser was “solely for
research, academic, or experimental purposes,” the District Court agreed
with Duke’s argument that the laser’s use was covered by the research
exemption and thus Duke was not liable for infringement.14 On appeal,
however, the Federal Circuit found this formulation of the exemption to
be overly broad, noting that only use of patented inventions “for
amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity or for strictly philosophical inquiry”
would be protected from liability.15 Backed by an impeccable
precedential pedigree,16 the court further noted that the experimental use
exemption17 would not apply if the use of the invention was under the
“guise of scientific inquiry,” had “definite, cognizable, and not
insubstantial commercial purposes,”18 or had the “slightest commercial
implication.”19 Because Duke is in the business of procuring government
and private research grants, and much of its potential to attract students’
tuition payments depends on its research prowess, the court ruled that the
experimental use exemption was not available to Duke.20 The court
reasoned that teaching and research constituted two of Duke’s
“legitimate business objectives,” making use of the laser an inexcusable
infringement.21
One implication of Madey is that the research exemption will likely
be deemed unavailable, even to a non-profit research organization whose
specific research has no immediate commercial implication.22 The logical
13. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958
(2003).
14. Id. at 1361.
15. Id. at 1362 (quoting Embrex, Inc. v. Service Engineering Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1348
(Fed. Cir. 2000)).
16. After Justice Story’s formulation of the exemption, courts uniformly refused to exempt
anyone from infringement liability, all the while insisting that the existence of the exemption was
“well settled law.” This reminds the author of his childhood, when his older brother would
repeatedly insist that performance of some household chore, invariably assigned to the older brother,
would result in some attractive benefit, only to find the performance technically lacking. See, e.g.,
Hogg v. Emerson, 52 U.S. 587, 608 (1850); Embrex, 216 F.3d at 1346; Madey, 307 F.3d at 1359-61;
Infigen, Inc. v. Advanced Cell Tech., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 967, 981 (W.D. Wisc. 1999); Poppenhusen
v. New York Gutta Percha Comb Co., 19 Fed. Cas. 1059, No. 11,283 (C.C. S.D. N.Y. 1858).
17. Note that this casenote follows Judge Newman’s convention of using the terms
“experimental use” and “research” interchangeably.
18. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362 (quoting Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., Inc., 733
F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
19. Embrex, 216 F.3d at 1353 (concurring opinion).
20. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362.
21. Id. (citing Pitcairn v. United States, 547 F.2d 1106, 1125-26 (Cl. Ct. 1976)). Notice that
Pitcairn involved tests with aims and implications that would clearly fall under a traditional
conception of “commercial.” The court truly stretched this concept in finding Duke’s experiments
“commercial” in Madey.
22. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362.
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result of Madey narrows the research exemption to the point that it has
little efficacy because it virtually guarantees that courts will be able to
ferret out some “commercial” application or purpose behind the
defendant’s use.23 One must pause to wonder where the exemption might
possibly be found to apply post-Madey. Despite the erosion of this
common law exemption and recognizing a need for protected use of
patented products, Congress has provided some statutory relief to
researchers in 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
B. Origins of § 271(e)(1) Safe-Harbor
In order to receive regulatory approval to produce and market a
prescription drug, a manufacturer must file a new drug application
(NDA) with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) proving that the
drug is safe and efficacious in the treatment of disease.24 The clinical
trials involved in amassing this proof are extremely expensive and timeconsuming.25 After the patent protection period on a particular drug
compound has expired, numerous companies generally enter the market
and produce what are commonly known as “generic” versions.
Before 1984, these generic drug manufacturers had to go through the
same regulatory process their “innovative” predecessor endured in filing
their NDA. The time spent waiting for the end of the patent period and
then repeating the approval process for a drug that had already proven
safe and effective resulted in an extension of the drug’s patent period.
Generic competitors were prevented from entering the field immediately
upon expiration of the patent because they had not, and by virtue of the
patent monopoly, could not, have undertaken the required testing. When
this distortion was assailed as unfair, innovative drug manufacturers
countered by pointing to the portion of their patent period lost to the
same initial regulatory approval process.
This dispute over distortions in the patent term found expression in
Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co.26 In Roche, the Federal Circuit
was faced with a generic drug manufacturer that produced samples of a
patented drug in order to conduct safety and efficacy tests in anticipation
23. Id. (stating that “use is disqualified from the defense if it has the ‘slightest commercial
implication[,]. . . . [is] in keeping with the legitimate business of the alleged infringer[,] . . . [or] is in
any way commercial in nature.”). The author struggles to conceive of any activities undertaken by
any entity that would not satisfy these elements.
24. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (2005).
25. Rick Mullin, Drug Development Costs About $1.7 Billion, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING
NEWS (Dec. 15, 2003), available at http://pubs.acs.org/cen/topstory/8150/8150notw5.html.
26. Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co. Inc., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 856 (1984).
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of the patent’s expiration. In defense, the generic drug manufacturer,
Bolar, claimed, inter alia, the experimental use exemption.27 However,
the court held the experimental use defense inapplicable and ruled that
any use of a patented drug compound by a generic drug manufacturer
before the patent’s expiration constituted infringement.28
In response to Roche, Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman Act of
1984.29 This act addressed the simultaneous compression and expansion
of patent terms mentioned above that occurred under the existing FDA
regime: the running of the patent period during the innovator’s extended
clinical trials and the de facto extension of the patent period resulting
from requiring generic manufacturers to redundantly perform these same
trials. To remedy these inequities, Congress established a new type of
FDA filing called an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA).30
Instead of reinventing the pharmaceutical wheel by performing anew the
same trials done by the innovator, under the ANDA, generic drug
manufacturers must simply prove that their version of a previously
approved drug is bioequivalent.31 Since bioequivalence simply means
that the generic drug works in the same way and has the same effect on
humans as the innovator, the result is a significantly less expensive and a
quicker approval process.32 The Act further provided for the extension of
a drug’s patent term depending on the length of time required for
regulatory approval of its NDA.33 In addition to simplifying the approval
process, the Act permitted certain experimental use of patented products
prior to patent expiration. It provided for pre-expiration use by
incorporating a new affirmative defense to infringement.34 The relevant
part of the Act reads:
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell
within the United States or import into the United States a patented
invention . . . solely for uses reasonably related to the development and
submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the
27. Roche, 733 F.2d at 862. It is interesting to note that the severely restrictive view of the
experimental use exemption that bolstered the CAFC’s decisions in Embrex and Madey has much of
its roots in Roche. Most troubling is the fact that Roche did not need to so restrict the experimental
use exemption. Bolar was clearly and admittedly using Roche’s patented compound for a
commercial purpose. The Madey court, however, cited Roche for the proposition that the non-profit,
non-commercial nature of the defendant is irrelevant.
28. Id. at 863.
29. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1993); 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282 (2003).
30. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2005).
31. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(7)(B) (2005).
32. 21 CFR § 320 (2005) (describing requirements for bioequivalence).
33. 35 U.S.C. § 155 (2005).
34. Freeburg, supra note 12, at n.92.
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manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products.35

This new defense, providing that patented drugs may be lawfully used if
the use is reasonably related to the submission of information to the
FDA, has been deemed the Hatch-Waxman or § 271(e)(1) safe-harbor.36
III. INTEGRA V. MERCK AT THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
A. The Safe-Harbor is Quickly Expanded
The impetus behind § 271(e)(1)’s safe-harbor was the frustration of
generic drug manufacturers and consumers with the lengthy and
duplicative process of generic drug approval. The United States Supreme
Court, however, quickly expanded the safe-harbor’s reach to innovative
medical devices.37 In Eli Lilly and Co. v. Medtronic, Inc. the applicable
law was the Federal Drug and Cosmetics Act (the FDCA), a “[f]ederal
law which regulates . . . drugs”38 and requires submission of information
for the approval of medical devices. Demonstrating his penchant for
close statutory reading, Justice Scalia held that the structure of the HatchWaxman Act as a whole indicated that it must have been intended to
include medical device use in the § 271(e)(1) safe-harbor.39 Thus, the
Court held that the language of § 271(e)(1) covered non-patent holders’
use of patented inventions as long as the use is related to submission of
information required under Federal law.40
B. Integra v. Merck Halts the Expansion
Despite its liberal reading of the § 271(e)(1) safe-harbor in Eli
Lilly,41 the Federal Circuit reversed course and limited the provision’s
applicability in Integra.42

35. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2005).
36. This Comment will refer to it as the “§ 271(e)(1) safe-harbor.”
37. Eli Lilly and Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990), vacated, 915 F.2d 670 (Fed.
Cir. 1990).
38. Eli Lilly. 496 U.S. at 661.
39. Id. at 669-70.
40. Id. at 672-73.
41. Id. at 664.
42. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003), corrected by
2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 27796 (July 10, 2003).
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1. Facts
Integra v. Merck involved a compound consisting of a three amino
acids segment of a protein patented by Integra Lifesciences. Called the
RGD peptide, this compound was known to be involved in process called
cell adhesion, which had possible applications in wound healing and
prosthetics. In addition, David Cheresh, a researcher at The Scripps
Research Institute,43 discovered that the RGD peptide had the ability to
inhibit angiogenesis, the process by which new blood vessels are formed
in the body.44
Sensing the importance of Cheresh’s discovery, Merck, a
pharmaceutical company,45 entered into an agreement with Cheresh and
Scripps under which Merck would provide funding and RGD peptides to
Cheresh’s lab.46 Under the agreement, Cheresh was to perform his
research with the purpose of developing potential drug candidates that
Merck would then shuttle through the regulatory approval process.47
Cheresh soon determined that three cyclic versions of the peptide were
most effective at inhibiting angiogenesis.48 These peptides were then
further studied by Cheresh’s lab “to evaluate [their] specificity, efficacy,
and toxicity . . . for various diseases, to explain the mechanism by which
these drug candidates work, and to determine which candidates were
effective and safe enough to warrant testing in humans.”49
Upon learning of the Scripps-Merck agreement, Integra50 offered to
43. “The Scripps Research Institute, one of the country’s largest, private, non-profit research
organizations, has always stood at the forefront of basic biomedical science, a vital segment of
medical research that seeks to comprehend the most fundamental processes of life. In just three
decades the Institute has established a lengthy track record of major contributions to the betterment
of health and the human condition.” Taken from Scripps’ website, available at http://www.scripps.
edu/intro/overview.html.
44. Integra, 331 F.3d at 863 (noting that anti-angiogenesis has potential for application in
treating cancer, rheumatoid arthritis and other debilitating diseases).
45. “Merck is a global pharmaceutical and chemical company with sales of EUR 5.9 billion
in 2004, a history that began in 1668, and a future shaped by 28,900 employees in 54 countries . . . .
Merck’s operating activities come under the umbrella of Merck KGaA, in which the Merck family
holds a 73% interest and free shareholders own the remaining 27%. The former U.S. subsidiary,
Merck & Co., has been completely independent of the Merck Group since 1917.” Taken from Merck
KGaA’s website, available at http://www.merck.de/servlet/PB/menu/1007020/index.html.
46. Integra, 331 F.3d at 863.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. These tests included assays to determine the action of the cyclic RGD peptides,
including, inter alia, toxicology, half-life in the bloodstream, and the optimum mode of
administration. Id.
50. “Integra LifeSciences Holdings Corporation is a diversified medical technology company
that develops, manufactures, and markets medical devices for use in a variety of applications. The
primary applications for our products are neuro-trauma and neurosurgery, reconstructive surgery,
general surgery, and soft tissue repair. However, our surgical instrument product lines are used in
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license use of the peptides to Cheresh. However, negotiations failed and
Integra filed a patent infringement suit against Scripps, Dr. Cheresh, and
Merck. The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California dismissed the suit against Scripps and Cheresh but ruled that
Merck had infringed Integra’s patents in part because § 271(e)(1) did not
immunize Merck from liability.51
2. Federal Circuit majority decision
In his opinion for the court, Judge Rader found support for his
restrictive reading of the § 271(e)(1) safe-harbor by focusing on the
Hatch-Waxman Act’s legislative history.52
According to the court, by limiting the safe-harbor to “solely . . . uses
reasonably related to the development and submission of information,”
Congress intended that the exemption be narrowly construed.53
Specifically, the “reasonably related” test focuses the analysis on the
information that is to be submitted to the FDA.54 Although some
experiments that do not directly produce information to the FDA might
be allowed, the term “solely” requires that these activities be closely
scrutinized by the court.55 Thus, the court held that Merck’s activities did
not meet the “reasonably related” test.56 Merck’s experiments constituted
general biomedical research and were aimed at identifying new
pharmaceutical compounds.57 Since “the FDA has no interest in the hunt
for drugs,” the experiments were not reasonably related to the
submission of information to the FDA and thus were not exempted from
infringement liability.58
As mentioned above, Judge Rader’s decision was influenced by the

virtually all surgical disciplines. . .” Taken from Integra’s website, available at http://www.integrals.com/corporate_info/profile.asp.
51. Integra had changed the nature of its action against Cheresh and Scripps from one
seeking damages for infringement to one for declaratory judgment, which would be somewhat akin
to an order simply enjoining them from further infringement. This declaratory judgment action was
dismissed on motion by Cheresh and Scripps. Integra, 331 F.3d at 863. Note that the District Court
found that Scripps’ pre-1995 activities were exempt from infringement liability under the commonlaw research exemption. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2379 (2005).
Because, however, the issue was not appealed to the CAFC or the United States Supreme Court, no
decision on the applicability of the exemption was made by these higher courts. Integra, 331 F.3d at
863, n.2; see discussion, infra Part V.
52. Integra, 331 F.3d at 866-67.
53. Id. at 866.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 865-66.
56. Id. at 866-67.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 866.
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Hatch-Waxman Act’s legislative history.59 For instance, Judge Rader
noted that § 271(e)(1) was passed essentially in response to Roche.60 He
found especially important legislative comments indicating that the
exemption was initially drafted to apply to “a limited amount of testing
so that generic manufacturers can establish the bioequivalency of a
generic substitute.”61 Although, the court was precluded by Eli Lilly from
holding that § 271(e)(1) applied exclusively to generic drug testing,
based on the legislative history, it adopted a narrow reading of the
exemption.62
The court’s opinion ranged from the somewhat contradictory to the
genuinely thought-provoking. For instance, Judge Rader applied a
restricted § 271(e)(1) in determining that Merck’s activities were “far
beyond those necessary to acquire information for FDA approval of a
patented pioneer drug already on the market.”63 The court justified its
holding by appealing to the rubric of generic drugs while claiming that §
271(e)(1)’s reach was not so limited. It then stated the obvious, that §
271(e)(1) did not apply to all experimental activity that at some point,
“however attenuated,” may lead to an FDA submission as a straw-man
argument it quickly blew down.64 On the other hand, the court was well
founded in its concern over the possible future of biotech research tool
patents under any other interpretation of § 271(e)(1). Specifically, Judge
Rader worried that extending the safe-harbor to the Scripps-Merck
activities would “effectively vitiate the exclusive rights of patentees
owning biotechnology tool patents.”65
3. Judge Newman’s dissent
Judge Newman penned a vigorous dissent in Integra v. Merck in
which she challenged the majority’s inattention to the common-law
experimental use exception and its limiting treatment of the § 271(e)(1)

59. See supra Part II.
60. Integra, 331 F.3d at 865; see also supra, n.29 and accompanying text.
61. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, at 8 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, at
2692).
62. Id. at 867 (citing Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. 661). It is interesting that the court’s original opinion
in Integra was amended. The errata decision, reported at 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 27796, softened the
restrictive wording of the opinion near the beginning of page *17, so as to bring it in line with Eli
Lilly (i.e. the original Integra opinion was much more explicit in its limitation of the § 271(e)(1)
safe-harbor to generic drugs).
63. Id. “[D]rug already on the market” being an obvious reference to the testing involved in
the development of generic drugs.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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safe-harbor.66
Newman essentially argued that the experimental use exception
should extend to any testing performed on the patented invention itself,
regardless of the possible downstream commercial applications. While
not even mentioned by the majority, she distinguished between using a
patented invention to perform tests or experiments and testing or
experimenting on the patented invention itself.67 She identified
acceptable purposes for experimenting on a patented invention as
including “understand[ing] it, or to improve upon it, or to find a new use
for it, or to modify or ‘design around’ it.”68 Furthermore, she emphasized
that experimentation with an obvious commercial intent should not
remove the activities from the common-law research exemption so long
as the tests were aimed at understanding, improving, or modifying the
patented invention.69 This distinction is important because it ameliorates
the majority’s concern that an expansive safe-harbor would vitiate the
value of research tool patents.70 Therefore, under Judge Newman’s
analysis, since Cheresh’s experiments focused on studying the properties
of the cyclic RGD peptides themselves rather than using the peptides to
test other compounds,71 they qualified for the infringement exception.72
Judge Newman also identifies logical fallacies in the majority
decision and answers the majority’s public policy concerns. First,
Newman exposes a logical inconsistency created by the majority
opinion: extremely early stage research conducted by a qualified
institution would be exempt from liability under the experimental use
exception, late stage research that creates information that is submitted to
the FDA is exempted under § 271(e)(1), and the intervening research
period is a “strange . . . kind of limbo” in which infringing activities are
not shielded from liability.73 Second, she argues that recognition of an
66. Note that the author has adopted Judge Newman’s convention of equating the commonlaw research exemption and the experimental use exception. These two terms are synonymous
because Judge Newman sees the exemption as reaching use (generally in the form of experimental
research) that is aimed at understanding, modifying, or improving a patented invention itself. See
supra note 49.
67. Integra, 331 F.3d at 877-78 (Newman, J., dissenting). This distinction is cited by
Newman to respond to the majority’s worries about the “vitiat[ion]” of all biotech research tools.
68. Id. at 875 (Newman, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 876 (Newman, J., dissenting).
70. Though Newman was specifically discussing the research exemption and not the §
271(e)(1) safe-harbor, Newman sees the two constructs as intertwined and complementary.
71. Note that several of the Scripps-Merck experiments did appear to in fact use the RGD
peptides as positive controls in testing the anti-angiogenesis properties of other drug candidates.
Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2378-79 (2005). The implications of
this bewilderingly unnoticed fact will be discussed in PART V.
72. Integra, 331 F.3d at 876 (Newman, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 877.
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experimental use exemption ought not and need not be a free-for-all that
eviscerates the rights of patent-holders because testing using the
invention rather than testing on the invention would still be an
infringement; attention must be paid “[to] the mechanisms of the
creation, development, and use of technical knowledge, and [to] today’s
complexity of interactions among invention and the innovating fruits of
invention.”74
With regards to the specific facts of Integra, Newman argues that
incorporation of the experimental use exception in conjunction with §
271(e)(1) avoids the majority’s conundrum by providing more
continuous exemption coverage.75 As noted above, the majority’s strict
understandings of both the experimental use exemption and the §
271(e)(1) safe-harbor create a limbo-like no-man’s land in which Merck
inexcusably infringed Integra’s patents.76 While § 271(e)(1) admittedly
should not “reach back down the chain of experimentation to embrace
[the] development and identification of new drugs,” the experimental use
exemption should be co-extensive with § 271(e)(1) such that the latter
essentially picks up where the former left off.77
IV. MERCK V. INTEGRA AT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
A. Opinion and Analysis
Much ink was spilled in the pages of law reviews in response to the
Federal Circuit’s Integra decision.78 On appeal to the United States
Supreme Court, Merck elicited amicus briefs from far-ranging friends of
the court, including major players in the biotech, pharmaceutical, and
research tool industries.79 The stakes for the entire biotech and drug
development industries could not have been higher.
With his signature emphasis on statutory language, Justice Antonin
Scalia delivered the unanimous opinion for the Court.80 Scalia stated that
74. Id. at 876. See also Dreyfuss, supra note 1 (discussion of unique issues in biomedical
research that support a more vigorous experimental use exemption).
75. Further supporting exemption from liability is the fact that Integra’s predecessor, Telios,
had been unsuccessful in finding a useful application for the RGD peptides. Integra, 331 F.3d at 876
(Newman, J., dissenting). Some recent proposals for patent reform have centered on forcing patent
holders to develop the technology in their patents.
76. Id. at 876.
77. Id. at 877.
78. See, e.g., Freeburg, supra note 12; Dreyfuss, supra note 1.
79. Including Genentech, Biogen IDEC, Eli Lilly, Wyeth, Pfizer in support of Merck and
Affymetrix, Vaccinex, and several research universities in support of Integra.
80. This author trusts that the reader is aware of the rarity of a unanimous decision from
today’s Court, let alone one written by arguably the Court’s most polarizing member. Furthermore,
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the text of the statute indicated that it extended to “all uses of patented
inventions that are reasonably related to the development and submission
of any information under the FDCA.”81 Most significant in Scalia’s
paraphrase is his use of “all” and “any”;82 apparently the Court intended
to interpret the statute very broadly. Thus, unlike in the District Court
and the Federal Circuit, the phase of research from which the information
is garnered is not important to the Court. In fact, the Court stated that
even preclinical studies are within the scope of the safe-harbor.83
Under Scalia’s formulation of the rule, the key inquiry is identifying
what information the FDA might be interested in receiving in regards to
a drug candidate.84 Previously, lower courts struggled with defining
which information the FDA would be interested in, with one court even
taking the unique course of deferring to the FDA in deciding if a
particular defendant’s activities were “reasonably related.”85 Respondent
Integra attempted a definition that experimentation into a drug
candidate’s “efficacy, mechanism of action, pharmacokinetics and
pharmacology are not reasonably included in an [investigational new
drug application] (IND) or an NDA, and are therefore outside the scope
of the exemption.”86 In addressing this definition, the Supreme Court
quickly and simply dispatched it by pointing out that the FDA requires
that IND’s contain summaries of at least some of those factors which
were deemed unimportant by Integra.87 As the FDA is charged with
deciding whether clinical trials of an investigational drug would pose an
unreasonable risk, a drug developer would be shielded from infringement
liability for acts giving rise to any information relied upon by the FDA in
making this risk determination.88
Scalia then proceeded to evaluate the two-part rationale the Federal
Circuit used to support its definition of the safe-harbor rule. In the first
part of its rationale, the lower court noted that the FDA does not have
the brevity of the decision belies its significance.
81. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2380 (2005).
82. Merck, 125 S. Ct. at 2383 (2005) (§ 271(e)(1) exempts “from infringement all uses of
patented compounds ‘reasonably related’ to the process of developing information for submission
under any federal law regulating the manufacture, use, or distribution of drugs”) (emphasis in
original).
83. Id. at 2380 (2005).
84. Id. at 2382.
85. Nexell Therapeutics Inc. v. Amcell Corp., 143 F. Supp. 2d 407 (D. Del. 2001). The FDA
declined to decide the case, and the judge held that activities related to clinical trials were not
infringing.
86. Merck, 125 S. Ct. at 2381.
87. Id. (citing FDA regulations at 21 CFR §§ 312.22(a), (a)(5) (2005)).
88. Id. at 2381 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(i)(3)(B)(i); 21 CFR § 312.23(a)(8) (2005) (requiring
applicants to include pharmacological and toxicological studies that serve as the basis of their
conclusion that clinical testing would be “reasonably safe”)).
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any interest in the hunt for drugs; especially damning was the fact that
the experiments performed by Cheresh did not yield any information
which was actually submitted to the FDA.89 Scalia perceived this to be a
de facto restriction of the application of the safe-harbor rule to only
generic drugs.90 Furthermore, he reasoned that the Federal Circuit’s
rationale ignores the realities of drug development, where even late stage
drug trials are often abandoned and result in no submission to the FDA.91
In contrast, by adding the words “all” and “any” to the statute,
Congress permitted the safe-harbor rule to do what it was designed to do
– protect a drug maker that “. . . has a reasonable basis for believing that
a particular patented compound may work, through a particular
biological process, to produce a particular physiological effect, and uses
the compound in research that, if successful, would be appropriate to
include in a submission to the FDA.”92 However, this more expansive
reading of the rule is not all-encompassing. Instead, this language limits
the extent of the safe-harbor, suggesting that some knowledge of the
drug’s mechanism of action and physiological effect is required before
the infringing activities may be exempted.
The Court addressed the Federal Circuit’s second rationale by
essentially agreeing that the safe-harbor does not embrace all activities
that may at some “attenuated” point lead to an FDA submission.93 The
Court declared that research conducted with the reasonable belief that the
drug will have a desired effect is reasonably related to the submission of
information to the FDA.94
B. Balancing Protection with Purpose
The importance of the freedom granted to research institutions and
drug companies by the Court’s holding cannot be overstated. The Federal
Circuit had in essence restricted the extent of the safe-harbor to generic
drug development.95 Although under Eli Lilly, the decision could not
explicitly provide such a restriction, it did in effect do so by indicating
that only those activities that were certain to produce information

89. Id. at 2382 (quoting Integra, 331 F.3d at 865).
90. Id. at 2383. Only in the realm of generic drugs could an experimenter have sufficiently
sure knowledge that a particular experiment would actually result in submission of information to
the FDA. Id.; see supra notes 62 and 63.
91. Id. at 2383 (noting that the Federal Circuit’s construction of § 271(e)(1) renders the
exemption “illusory”).
92. Id. at 2382.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 2383.
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submitted to the FDA would be exempted from liability.96 The Court
correctly recognized that this take on the statute does not resonate with
the hit-and-miss nature of drug development.97
The importance of the Court’s decision is not likely to be lost on
commentators, if their uproarious reaction to Integra is any indication.98
Rochelle Dreyfus points out that Madey effectively destroyed the
common law research exemption and that Integra limited the § 271(e)(1)
to generic drug development.99 In contrast, after Merck, drug developers
are now much more free to test patented compounds and their derivatives
for potential pharmaceutical benefits. As an example, consider the fact
that drug companies have libraries compiled of thousands of chemical
compounds, many of which are “scaffold” compounds to which different
side chains and active groups may be added to achieve a certain
physiological effect.100 Under Integra, unauthorized use of such a
compound in experiments to test the compound’s safety and efficacy
would constitute an infringement unless the experiments involved

96. Id.
97. Merck, 125 S.Ct. at 2382-83 (noting that even late-stage clinical testing is not eventually
submitted to FDA since late-stage drug candidates can prove unworthy of submission for FDA
approval).
98. Dreyfuss, supra note 1; Freeburg, supra note 12. See generally Note, Integra v. Merck:
Limiting the Scope of the 271(e)(1) Exception to Patent Infringement, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 193
(2004); Angela M. Davison, Shrinking Waters in the Safe Harbor: Has Integra Lifesciences v.
Merck Turned the Tide by Narrowing Available Exempted Infringing Uses?, 59 FOOD DRUG L.J. 79
(2004).
99. Dreyfuss, supra note 1, at 461.
100. For instance, “steroid” refers to a broad class of chemical compounds often involved in
intercellular signaling. A steroid consists of a core component, or moiety, made up of several carbon
rings (the hexagons and pentagon in the diagram below). A long carbon “tail” (the zig-zag extending
up and to the left) has been added to the steroid “scaffold” to form cholesterol. This example begins
to give the reader an idea of the nearly infinite range of compounds that pharmaceutical companies
must screen in order to find a suitable drug candidate. The reader will also begin to see the
stranglehold a company would have if it owned a patent on the steroid core and other companies
could not even use the steroid to develop additions and modifications.
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humans.101 The Supreme Court, recognizing the vital role drug
companies play in the health of society, ruled that uses similar to the
imaginary modified scaffold above are shielded from liability so long as
the experimenter reasonably believes that the experiments will lead to
information that could ultimately be submitted to the FDA.102
Perhaps most importantly, the Court appears to have reaffirmed the
fundamental purpose behind the patent system: scientific and
technological advancement with the understanding that such will
improve people’s lives.103 Thus, although intellectual property protection
is the stated goal of patent protection, the underlying policy of patent
protection is improvement of the human condition. Accordingly, the
Hatch-Waxman Act modified patent protection in order to provide a
means for faster development and delivery to the public of affordable
generic drugs by carving out a limitation of the patent holder’s rights
(which had been artificially created by the patent law in the first
place).104 Likewise, while the first patent office administrator, Thomas
Jefferson, and others have recognized the importance of patent protection
to the advancement of science, this recognition has always been
tempered by a visceral suspicion of monopolies.105 When a patent has an
overwhelming effect of stifling innovation, it has outgrown the
justification for its existence and should be reined in. The Court in Merck
saw § 271(e)(1) as guarding against this: giving drug companies more
room in which to work and advance knowledge in medicine, the most
vital of areas.
V. MERCK’S MISSED OPPORTUNITIES
While Merck did much to correct a worrisome trend in the Federal
Circuit, neither the common law research exemption nor the applicability
of § 271(e)(1) to research tools were dealt with adequately, either
because the parties did not litigate these issues or because the Court’s

101. Generally speaking, mere addition of elements to a patented invention does not evade
infringement. Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. TriTech Microelectronics Intern., Inc., 246 F.3d 1336,
1348 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
102. Recall that there appears to be the added requirement that the researcher have some idea
of the physiological effect of the drug. See Merck, 125 S. Ct. at 2383.
103. The “embarrassment” of a patent monopoly is tolerated only to the extent it spurs
innovation. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) (quoting Thomas Jefferson, first
administrator of the patent system in the United States). See infra Part V for more discussion of this
compromise and why the courts must always be mindful of the basis of patent law.
104. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003); corrected
by 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 27796, *11 (July 10, 2003) (quoting Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm, Ltd., 110
F.3d 1562, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
105. Graham, 383 U.S. at 7-9.
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unusually taciturn opinion simply did not address them.
A. Common Law Research Exemption
As Judge Newman pointed out in her dissent, Integra v. Merck
offered an excellent opportunity to reinvigorate the common law
research exemption.106 Unfortunately, the Court missed this opportunity.
For example, the Merck-Scripps collaboration aimed initially at
synthesizing and studying the RGD peptide and derivatives in the hopes
of understanding the full extent of their biological properties. Under the
Court’s decision, unless the researchers had “a reasonable belief that the
compound [would] cause the sort of physiological effect [they intended]
to induce,” any tests conducted would not have been covered by the safeharbor rule.107 In contrast, under Judge Newman’s formulation of the
experimental use exemption, such activities would have been shielded
from liability regardless of any FDA submission.108
The most important consequence of a resurrected experimental use
would be the added freedom inventors would have to advance
technology beyond its current state, as represented by the patented
invention. An inventor’s ability to “design around” and/or improve upon
the patented invention is seriously limited if his access to the invention is
restricted to his ability to obtain a license.
In addition, a meaningful common law exemption accommodates
intellectual property protection, while at the same time balancing it with
the unique aspects of biotechnology.109 Indeed, the experimental use
exemption was acceptable in its exceedingly narrow form because,
before biotech, there existed a clear conceptual and legal division
between fundamental science and its application in end-products.
Fundamental discoveries—such as the scaffold compounds mentioned in
the above example—were not patentable and only the downstream
applications of these discoveries would be granted a patent that was
limited in scope to reach only other end-products.110 In biotechnology, by
contrast, frontier discoveries often have immediate applications and are
granted broad upstream patents that severely hamper the activities of
subsequent researchers.111 This has been described as the problem of the
106. Integra, 331 F.3d at 874 (Newman, J., dissenting).
107. Merck, 125 S.Ct. at 2383.
108. Integra, 331 F.3d at 876 (Newman, J., dissenting).
109. Dreyfuss, supra note 1, at 463 (noting that the “fruits of biotechnology,” unlike in many
other areas of science and technology, often have immediate commercial applications).
110. See, Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-35 (1966); see also, In re Fisher, 421 F.3d
1365, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
111. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1372.
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anticommons and recognition of its severity has been increasing.112 If
access to fundamental scientific discoveries—such as antibodies against
a certain cell-receptor or the purified form of a gene known to exist in
people particularly susceptible to breast cancer113—is limited by broad
patents and the abolition of the experimental use exception, innovation
will be asphyxiated.
Admittedly, the Federal Circuit’s and the Supreme Court’s refusal to
address this issue is technically well-founded as the parties did not raise
it on appeal.114 The Supreme Court, at least, has shown itself amenable to
deciding issues not raised at trial or on appeal but whose policy
implications beg for resolution.115 Further, Judge Newman’s impassioned
plea for the resurrection of the experimental use exception and both
courts’ proclivity for deciding or at least discussing collateral issues give
one pause when considering what might have been had the Court taken
the liberty to address this issue.
B. Research Tools
Perhaps the most important issue in Merck was the application of §
271(e)(1) and to a lesser extent the common-law research exemption to
patented research tools. Yet, discussion of protection of research tools
was largely ignored because the Court erroneously deemed it not to be
found in the record.116
1. Misreading the record
In one seemingly innocuous sentence in his recitation of Merck’s

112. Freeburg, supra note 12, at 399 (discussing Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, Science 698 (1998)). The
problem of the commons was described as the inefficient use of a resource due to its being owned by
all of society “in common.” The problem of the anticommons, in contrast, exists when too many
parties hold exclusive rights and the elbow room required to advance science is lacking.
113. Dreyfuss, supra note 1, at 459-60 (discussing example of patenting of the BrcA1 gene).
114. Integra, 331 F.3d at 863, note 2.
115. For a recent, controversial example of the Supreme Court looking into a question not
raised or preserved at trial, briefed on appeal to the Federal Circuit, or mentioned in the request for
certiorari, see LabCorp v. Metabolite, U.S. Supreme Court Docket No. 04-607, available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/04-607.htm (asking the Solicitor General to brief the Court
on the patentability of the claims at issue in view of Diamond v. Diehr’s ruling that “one cannot
patent ‘laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.’”). This question was not broached by
either party at trial nor in the lower courts, but the Court in its discretion has at least expressed
interest in deciding it. See Amicus Curiae Brief of American Intellectual Property Law Association
in Support of Respondent at 3-4, n.5, Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings, v. Metabolite
Laboratories, Inc., 370 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (No. 04-607).
116. Infra, note 119.
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facts, Justice Scalia stated that “Scripps used the RGD peptide in . . . tests
as ‘positive controls’ against which to measure the efficacy of the
mimetics.”117 To the casual reader this may seem unimportant, but it
represents one of the key facts of the case. Scripps not only studied the
RGD peptides themselves for their efficacy, safety and mode of action,
but used them as a tool against which to compare the efficacy of other
compounds. This use, since it is not experimentation on the patented
invention itself but use of the invention in conducting research on
another compound, is exactly the type of use that should not fall behind
the shield of Judge Newman’s reinvigorated experimental use
exception.118 Likewise, those in the pharmaceutical and biotech
industries recognize this sort of use as that of a research tool.119
Merck could be read to exempt, under § 271(e)(1), the use of a
patented compound as a research tool to study another compound that is
a drug candidate, but this reading would probably be an impermissible
stretch.120 Trying to assuage the Federal Circuit’s fears that patents on
research tools would be effectively eviscerated if activities such as
Merck’s were exempted from infringement liability, the Court expressly
stated that its holding did not apply to research tools.121 It is not clear
whether the Court refused to decide the question because it was not
argued—which would be an acceptable reason for omitting such a vital
issue—or because the record did not include use of research tools—
which would be erroneous. The applicability of § 271(e)(1) to research
tools was left open by the Court to be decided another day. But, as will
be shown below, this was arguably the most important aspect of the
case!122
117. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2379 (2005) (emphasis
added).
118 . Integra, 331 F.3d at 877-78 (Newman, J., dissenting). Note that Judge Newman, unlike
the Integra majority, joined and the Supreme Court in misreading the record as containing no use of
the peptides as research tools. Id.
119. Brief for Invitrogen Corp. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 18-20,
Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (No. 03-1237); see also
Integra, 331 F.3d at 872, n.4.
120. The author admits, however, that there is language in Merck that could allow such a
reading. See Merck, 125 S. Ct. at 2382.
121. Merck, 125 S. Ct. at note 7 (stating that it was “apparent from the record” that the RGD
peptides were not used as research tools).
122. As Judge Newman pointed out in her dissent, the Federal Circuit essentially
acknowledged that Scripps used the peptides as a research tool and proceeded to decide that this use
did not fall within the § 271(e)(1) safe-harbor. Integra, 331 F.3d at 877-78 (Newman, J., dissenting).
The Supreme Court should have treated research tools in its decision, even though this point was not
appealed, because a reversal of the Federal Circuit’s decision could be interpreted to mean that §
271(e)(1) does apply to research tools regardless of the Court’s attempts to limit its holding. Brief
for Invitrogen Corp. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 19-20, Integra Lifesciences I,
Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (No. 03-1237).
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2. Why unique biotech issues require both the common law exemption
and a vigorous § 271(e)(1) safe-harbor
Biotechnology and biomedical research depend largely upon the use
of patented compositions of matter for their advancement. Antibodies,
purified DNA sequences, cell surface receptors and other biological
products are essential components to any research project. However,
broad patents have been granted on such “tools,” making even
fundamental biomedical research an expensive or, in cases where the
patent holder belligerently refuses to license, an impossible endeavor. As
Rochelle Dreyfuss has noted, biotech has changed the former paradigm
that consisted of linear advancement from unpatentable fundamental
research and discovery to patentable consumer end-products.123
It is a core tenet of patent law that products, laws, and phenomena of
nature are not patentable.124 An obvious reason for this is that the
inventor has arguably not invented anything when he discovers a law or
product of nature and thus deserves no patent rights.125 Perhaps the
firmest basis for this universal bar on the patentability of products of
nature, though, is that these things form the foundation for further
research,126 and allowing their patenting would stifle development of
applications that might stem from them. In the arena of biomedical
research and biotechnology, however, elements that skirt the line
between products of nature and products of man, such as an isolated
human gene or an antibody to a particular antigen, are patentable. In the
exemplary case of a patented gene, patentability may be defensible based
on the presence of direct, immediate commercial applications, such as
using the gene as a tool to diagnose certain diseases or predispositions. In
other words, in biotech the line between a fundamental law or product of
nature and an application of the law or end-product is blurred.
This quandary may be resolved by holding fast to the basic principles
of the American patent system. Monopolistic patent rights are not
awarded based on some Lockean system of reward or desserts.127 Patent
rights are artificial creations of the patent law granted by legislative
123. Dreyfuss, supra note 1, at 463.
124. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 312 (1980).
125. Under this Lockean analysis, patents are awarded based on the rights or desserts of the
inventor – i.e. the inventor has mixed his labor with the raw materials in order to create a new
invention that has, in turn, become his. It is important to note, however, that even this philosophical
view of patents is not the one embraced by the United States. Robert P. Merges, et al., Intellectual
Property in the New Technological Age 119 (3rd ed., Aspen Publishers 2003).
126. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1980); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
127. See supra note 103.
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grace “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”128 The
ultimate value129 in the isolation of a gene associated with a particular
disorder is its potential for leading to a cure, not simply identifying the
people who have the disorder. This is where science and the useful arts
are truly advanced. Researchers, especially those at universities and other
non-profit research institutions (such as Scripps), should have free access
to such genes in order to determine what the particular gene product is
and how either blocking or enhancing its action would treat the
disorder.130 Further advancement is restrained, however, if the owner of
the gene patent refuses to license or charges stiff fees.131 In trying to
secure patent holders’ rights, the founders, and Thomas Jefferson in
particular,132 did not intend such a disastrous suffocation of innovation.133
VI. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
At its heart, this Comment is not about an obscure problem in drug
patent law. While it is true that the implications of Merck’s omissions
reach primarily into the realm of biomedical research and drug
development, these fields in turn implicate health care, drug prices, and
other hot button issues that are continually on the legislative agenda and
seem to play a part in every presidential election.
A. Revitalization of Common Law Research Exemption
Judge Newman’s dissent suggested the resurrection of the
experimental use exception in order to solve the anticommons problem
of squelching downstream innovation by broad upstream patents.134
Certainly, this is long overdue. Madey arguably misconstrued the nature
of university and non-profit research. Judge Newman’s formulation of
the research exemption, which focuses more on the nature of the use than

128. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
129. “Value” here refers to the societal value rather than the monetary value underlying the
patent.
130. This activity would likely be included under the experimental use exception formulated
by Judge Newman since the researchers are largely studying the invention itself (the touchstone of
Judge Newman’s proposed experimental use analysis). Integra, 331 F.3d at 875-76 (Newman, J.,
dissenting).
131. Example of BrcA1 gene in Dreyfuss, supra note 1, at 459-60.
132. VI Writings of Thomas Jefferson 180-81 (H.A. Washington ed.) (as cited approvingly in
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966)).
133. See, e.g., Report of the National Institutes of Health Working Group on Research Tools
App. D, available at http://www.nih.gov/news/researchtools/appendd.htm (June 4, 1998).
134. Integra, 331 F.3d at 875-76 (Newman, J., dissenting); see also Freeburg, supra note 12,
at 399.
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the possibility of commercial applications, would do much to help return
fundamental research to its previously free and open state.135
Merck, as noted above, will serve to lessen the impact of the death of
the research exemption by expanding the applicability of § 271(e)(1).
Within the limited field of research that might reasonably lead to
submission of information to the FDA, Merck prevented the likely
chilling effects that Integra could have had. But Merck failed to look at
the question of whether § 271(e)(1) and the common law research
exemption apply to research tools—a question with implications far
beyond the preparation of drug candidates for regulatory approval.
While Judge Newman wisely suggested the revitalization of a
judicial doctrine that has all but fallen by the wayside, she did not go far
enough.136 Judge Newman’s common law exemption fails to solve the
problem of a rapidly shrinking public domain in scientific research
because unauthorized use of research tools is still prohibited, even if that
use is by universities or other institutions to which the common law
exemption should presumptively apply.
B. Mandatory Waivers of Future Patent Rights by Researchers
Rochelle Dreyfuss suggests an intriguing solution to the problem: a
modified research exemption in which universities and research
institutions may use a patented invention—either to study it or to use it
as a research tool—without a license only if they agree in an explicitly
binding waiver not to pursue patent protection for any invention that may
derive from such use.137
This limited common law exemption rubric is problematic in that it
takes away universities’ economic incentive (a patented product) for
investing large amounts of money in using the research tools to develop
applications. In other words, would anyone ever sign such a waiver of
patent rights?138 Even still, Dreyfus’ suggestion is worth deeper
legislative consideration.
C. Judicial Activism
One conceivable avenue for enhancing the public domain in biotech

135. See Dreyfuss, supra note 1, at 462-64 for a discussion of the previously vast public
sphere in which fundamental research operated, where basic research discoveries were freely shared
amongst universities. See also Introduction, supra.
136. Integra, 331 F.3d at 878 (Newman, J., dissenting).
137. Dreyfuss, supra note 1, at 471.
138. See id. at 472.
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research would be to simply call on the courts to construe the utility
requirement of patent law narrowly such that patenting of compositions
of matter as research tools is not allowed.139 There is some promise in
this given a recent Federal Circuit decision in which a DNA patent was
invalidated based in part on the PTO’s determination that the patentee
was attempting to claim “starting points for further research, not the endpoint of any research effort.”140 Further, using a chemical compound in a
research setting is arguably not a “use” within the meaning of § 271
because the invention’s true utility is in its use as a drug, reagent, etc.141
Another route, suggested by Judge Rader, is simply to allow the courts to
apply damages in such a way as to give the common law research
exemption bite.142
Courts have been exceedingly resistant, however, to read any
additional limitations into the patent laws, especially regarding utility.143
In response to arguments about the stifling of innovation similar to those
put forth in this article, the Federal Circuit in the case of In re Fisher has
already stated that it will not weigh such policy issues since they are
“more appropriately directed to Congress.”144 Judge Rader’s dissent in
Fisher further indicates that research tools would probably be deemed to
have a utility under § 101.145 Thus any narrow construction of the “use”
of patented inventions must be statutorily mandated, as discussed below.
D. Legislative Action
In contrast to the above suggestions, the following two-part solution
requires revision of existing statutory patent law: first, a patent should be
required to specifically claim the use of the invention as a research tool,
much as a process patent must be clearly claimed as such; second,
139. In order to receive a patent, an invention must new and useful. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2005).
This is commonly known as the “utility requirement” and has been a source of vexation for many
seeking biotechnology patents. See, e.g., In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
140. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1370.
141. “Reagents” are chemicals that participate in reactions. Often reagents set the stage for and
assist a particular reaction in taking place, but generally are not the focus.
142. Embrex v. Service Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Rader, J.,
concurring) (noting that the amounts involved in damage awards are naturally tailored in such a way
as to make truly experimental uses essentially exempt).
143. See, e.g., In re Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1378; see also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S.
303, 308 (1980).
144. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1378. Note, however, the court upheld the PTO’s determination that
the applicant was trying to claim “starting points for further research” when he pointed out that the
DNA sequences could be used in several biomedical research applications such as gene expression
microarrays.
145. Id. at 1379 (Rader, J., dissenting) (stating that research tools have a specific and
substantial utility, namely performing scientific research).
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infringing “use” of a patented invention must be limited to using the
invention in the way specifically claimed.
The first part of this rule would be accomplished by creating a
research tool patent category, in addition to the present categories of
compositions of matter, products by processes, and methods. Once this
new category has been created, special rules governing research tool
patents could be created, such as disallowing research tool claims on
compositions of matter.
For instance, research tool claims could be granted by the PTO only
in cases where the invention is an actual machine or implement that has
utility limited only to use in a research setting—i.e. compositions of
matter such as the RGD peptide at issue in Merck would not be
patentable as research tools because they have potential usefulness as
drugs. In a scenario such as the diagnostic gene “imagined” above,146 the
extent of patent protection would be limited to the clinical applications
for which the patent was originally sought, such as diagnosis of diseases.
Under this new system, the patents at issue in Merck would only have
been allowed to exclude competitors from using the RGD peptides as
compositions of matter (i.e. as a pharmaceutical drug). Use of the RGD
peptides as positive controls in laboratory testing of other compounds
without a license would be permitted because by statute, the RGD
peptide could not be claimed as a research tool. Congress could soften
any harsh effects of this new rubric by allowing the patentee to elect
either claiming the invention as a research tool or a more general
composition of matter, rather than requiring wholesale denial of research
tool claims in the case of compositions of matter.
In combination with the above suggestion, which would restrict
which uses may be included in a particular patent, limitations could also
be placed on which types of use constitute infringement. For instance,
when a patent specifies the utility of the claimed invention, only uses of
the invention conforming to this specific utility would be considered
infringing. There is precedent for limiting the infringement causes of
action that may be brought under certain types of patents. For example,
doctors may not, for reasons of pure public policy, be sued for
infringement of a patent on a surgical procedure.147
This solution is not without its limitations. Congress does not like to
146. Supra note 113 and accompanying text.
147. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1) (2000). For discussion of proposal for a limitation on
infringement liability similar to the one exempting physicians, see S. Minwalla, A Modest Proposal
to Amend the Patent Code 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) to Allow Health Care Providers to Examine their
Patients’ DNA, 26 Ill. U. L.J. 471-504 (2002) (proposing to expand the provision in the Patent Act
that protects physicians from infringement actions for performing medical procedures to include
genetic tests).
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make drastic changes to the patent law, and creating an additional patent
category would definitely be drastic. Furthermore, Judge Rader’s
concern over eviscerating research tool patents still looms and it would
take deep legislative analysis to tailor the new statutory scheme so as to
ensure that biotech research tool patents retain some value. But this
solution promises to be surprisingly elastic and would have much room
for adjustment and refinement by Congress. For instance, Congress could
define this suggested new category of patents as broadly or narrowly as it
deems prudent. Or it could combine solutions by only requiring research
institutions such as universities to sign Professor Dreyfuss’ waiver when
they want exempted use of patents that fall into the suggested new
category. The suggestions above are a good starting point from which
Congress can plod forward.
E. Anxiety over Changes is Not Unreasonable, Only Misguided
Courts are reluctant to change their interpretation of the patent law
and Congress is anxious about making any drastic legislative changes.148
Judge Rader agonized over the effect an overly broad § 271(e)(1) safeharbor would have on the value of research tool patents.149 After all,
essential to the patent system’s ability to promote the progress of science
and technology is its ability to incentivize research and development by
providing for recuperation of costs. Others have wondered whether any
legislation or court action can realistically put this genie back into its
bottle.150
Focusing too intensely on the above concerns, however, ignores
arguably more important and troubling issues in biotech patent law. For
instance, the loss of the free sharing of knowledge that existed amongst
universities and between universities and industry has led to a “patent
thicket,” navigation through which has become prohibitively expensive
for many universities.151 In essence, broad upstream patents in biotech
148. See, e.g., In re Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1378; see also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303,
308 (1980); see also Michael Kanellos, Patent System’s Problems Defy Easy Solutions, CNET (Aug.
4,
2005),
available
at
http://news.com.com/Invention+intervention—
fixing+the+patent+system/2009-1001_3-5817175.html?tag=nl (noting the complexity of fixing
patent system by legislation and the competing values and concerns that make it complex).
149. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 867 (Fed. Cir. 2003),
corrected by 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 27796 (July 10, 2003).
150. Kanellos, supra note 148.
151. Janice M. Mueller, The Evanescent Experimental Use Exemption from United States
Patent Infringement Liability: Implications for University and Nonprofit Research and Development,
56 Baylor L. Rev. 917, 944-45 (2004); see also Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can
Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Science 698 (1998);
Janice M. Mueller, No “Dilettante Affair”: Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to Patent
Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 Wash. L. Rev. 1, 10 (2001).
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have created Goldberg-like entitlements in the minds of many biotech
companies.152 Many firms have forayed into the realm of basic research,
previously reserved to universities, in the hopes of hitting the next patent
mother lode. This begs the question of why the research university
community must suffer because of a calculated maneuver by
corporations.153
VII. CONCLUSION
Action is needed to return the patent law to its roots. Jefferson would
undoubtedly be embarrassed at how far the patent law has diverged from
its original basis in promoting scientific advance.154 The insinuation of
Lockean principles of desserts in patent law has caused anti-competitive
patents to become the norm in scientific research, rather than procompetitive free access.
Some recent court decisions have slowed the erosion of the scientific
public domain, but greater action is required. Regardless of which of the
above solutions is adopted by the courts, Congress must recognize that a
problem of a shrinking public sphere exists in biomedical research and
that, due to judicial inertia in the case of Merck or counterproductive
activism in the case of Integra, only legislative action will provide
effective and lasting relief. Otherwise, scientific progress may be
suffocated by the very device created to promote it.
Benjamin G. Jackson*

152. See generally Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (Court held that government
provision of certain welfare benefits for a period of time created an entitlement to these benefits).
Many companies have similarly become overly dependent on these upstream patents and thus have
begun to feel entitled to them almost as of right. Notice that this attitude is fundamentally at odds
with the patent law’s refusal to base its grant of rights in any kind of desserts owed to the inventor.
Supra note 103.
153. The sophistication of corporations in general and biotech firms in particular, coupled with
the conscious decision to encroach on research ground previously reserved for non-profits and
universities, makes the award of Goldberg-like entitlements especially questionable.
154. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
* J.D. Candidate, 2007. J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University.

